QB-2021-003576

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

BETWEEN:

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS LIMITED

Claimant

- and -

(1) PERSONS UNKNOWN CAUSING THE BLOCKING OF, ENDANGERING, OR PREVENTING THE FREE FLOW OF TRAFFIC ON THE M25 MOTORWAY, A2 A20 AND A2070 TRUNK ROADS AND M2 AND M20 MOTORWAY, A1(M), A3, A12, A13, A21, A23, A30, A414 AND A3113 TRUNK ROADS AND THE M1, M3, M4, M4 SPUR, M11, M26, M23 AND M40 MOTORWAYS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTESTING
(2) MX CATHERINE RENNIE-NASH AND 9 OTHERS

Defendants

SKELETON ARGUMENT OF THE CLAIMANT

For Hearing 26 April 2024

PRELIMINARY

Hearing Time Estimate: Half a day

References

[HB/x] page x of the Hearing Bundle
[AB/X] page x of the Authorities Bundle
[SM/x] paragraph x of the Second Witness Statement of Sean Martell dated 26 March 2024 ("**Martell 2**") and Exhibits [HB/X]
[PB/x] paragraph x of the Witness Statement of Petra Billing dated 18 April 2024 ("**Billing 1**") [HB/X]

Suggested Pre-Reading (t/e 2 hours)

- Martell 2
- Billing 1
- *NHL v Persons Unknown* [2023] EWHC 1073 (KB) ("**Cotter Judgment**") [AB/79]

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1. This is the Claimant's ("**NHL**") skeleton argument for the extension and variation of an injunction order protecting the Strategic Road Network ("**SRN**") in the South East of England – particularly the M25, certain Kent SRN roads and feeder roads onto the M25.

2. On 9 May 2022, in response to NHL's application for summary judgment ("**SJ Application**"), Bennathan J made an order ("**Bennathan Order**") [HB/478] consolidating three extant proceedings ("**the Claims**") and granting interim and final precautionary injunctions against certain named defendants ("**Named Defendants**") and persons unknown. The learned judge's reasons are recorded in his judgment, *NHL v Persons Unknown* [2022] EWHC 1105 (QB) ("**Bennathan Judgment**") [AB/192].

3. Bennathan J acceded to the SJ Application in part: he dismissed the SJ Application in relation to (i) 109 of the (then) 133 Named Defendants; and (ii) persons unknown ("**D1**"). A final injunction and costs were awarded against 24 Named Defendants. On 16 January 2023, Bennathan J made a further order which dealt with the costs of the SJ Application ("**Costs Order**") [HB/533].

4. NHL appealed the learned judge's approach to the SJ Application. On 14 March 2023, for reasons set out in its judgment: [2023] EWCA Civ 182 ("**CoA Judgment**") [AB/153], the Court of Appeal allowed NHL's appeal and made an amended order ("**CoA Order**") [HB/538]. By paragraph 2 of the CoA Order, the Bennathan Order was set aside bar certain paragraphs, and final injunctive relief was granted as against the Defendants until 23:59 on 9 May 2023. The only minor amendment by the Court of Appeal was to remove tunnelling from the list of prohibited activities.

5. The CoA Order was effective, and so NHL made an application to extend the injunction. The application came before Cotter J on 24 April 2023. His Lordship made three orders, dated 5 May [HB/586], 24 July [HB/629] and 3 October [HB/635] 2023, mostly as a result of removing Named Defendants from the Claims, which may be referred to collectively as (the "**Cotter Injunction**"). In the Cotter Injunction, the learned judge:

    a. Accepted undertakings from most of the Named Defendants, and ordered those Named Defendants to be removed as defendants to the Claims;

b. Permitted the addition of 6 Named Defendants;

c. Varied the sunset clause in the Bennathan/CoA Orders until 23.59hrs on 10 May 2024 so as to continue injunctive relief;

d. Permitted service by alternative method on the First Defendant ("**D1**") – persons unknown, and upon Named Defendants;

e. Made an order for third-party disclosure (by consent) in respect of disclosure by police forces to NHL;

f. Made further directions including:

i. At paragraph 19 a direction that: "…this order will be reconsidered at a hearing on Friday 26th April 2024 at 10.30am…to determine whether there is a continued threat which justifies continuation of this Order…. No further application shall be required".

ii. At paragraph 20 a direction that: "The Defendants or any other person affected by this Order may apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge it…"

g. Made various costs orders in respect of Named Defendants.

6. Cotter J provided detailed analysis and his Lordship's reasons are in the Cotter Judgment.

7. Although this skeleton argument seeks to provide the Court with much of the detail of NHL's claims and the genesis of the Cotter Injunction, NHL's case in a nutshell is that the Cotter Injunction has been effective, yet there remains a continued threat with justifies continuation of injunctive relief.

8. The only substantive variation to the Cotter Injunction which NHL seeks is the extension of injunctive relief for a period of 2 years, rather than 1 year. Again, briefly, the reasons are:

a. NHL only seeks to continue injunctive relief against persons unknown (as it seeks to remove all Named Defendants from the Cotter Injunction);

b. There is a considerable cost to the public purse in a yearly review both in terms of time spent by NHL's staff, the use of Court resources, and the cost of preparing for each review which falls on the public purse;

c. No person affected by the Cotter Injunction has made an application to discharge it since the precursor injunctions were granted in September 2021; and

d. What is prohibited by the Cotter Injunction may also be a criminal offence: there is protection built into the revised Draft Order now sought [HB/181] (in common with previous orders) in the recital which makes plain that the Cotter Injunction is not intended to prohibit lawful protest.

BACKGROUND

9. These proceedings have a long history. The history up until April 2023 is set out in detail in the Cotter Judgment [7] – [59] and so not repeated here.

10. Since April 2023, Mr Martell explains that:

a. On 27 April 2023, NHL issued its sixth application for committals for contempt of court. At the committal hearings in October 2023, 10 of the contemnors were not awarded any sanction on the basis of lack of knowledge of the injunctions, and the remaining contemnors were awarded sanctions of suspended custodial sentences for two years [SM/32].

b. On 10 August 2023, NHL issued its seventh application for committal for contempt of court. At the committal hearings in March 2024, the Court accepted undertakings from 11 Defendants who promised not to breach the relevant injunction for a period of two years; 2 Defendants were awarded no further sanction; and 3 Defendants were awarded sanctions of suspended custodial sentences for two years [SM/33]. The Application was adjourned against 2 further Defendants, as they glued themselves to the gates of the Royal Courts of Justice. The adjourned hearing for these 2 Defendants is adjourned until 17 May 2024.

c. Also on 10 August 2023, NHL issued its eighth application for committal for contempt of court. That application has yet to be heard (it is listed for 4 – 10 June 2024), but several of the Defendants have offered undertakings for two years.

11. Mr Martell is clear that there have been no protests on the Strategic Road Network ("**SRN**") since 10 November 2022 [SM/35] but makes plain his view that the reason for this is that the Court's protection, and NHL's willingness to enforce injunctions, is why unlawful direct action protest on the SRN has been controlled.

NEED FOR CONTINUED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

12. There is a compelling case for the Cotter Injunction to be continued, and the Court is respectfully invited to continue it.

13. A cursory read through of the history set out in the Cotter Judgment and in Martell 2 shows the extent of the disruption which has been controlled by the benefit of the Court's protection, and the extensive costs both of the disruptive behaviour and in seeking and enforcing the injunctions.

14. The Court will note that at present, the Cotter Injunction is the only injunction obtained by NHL which remains in force [SM/31]. If the Cotter Injunction is not continued, there will be no injunctions in force protecting the SRN, and in particular, the M25 which has been the main focus of direct action protest on the SRN.

15. The Court will be aware that since the Cotter Judgment, the Supreme Court handed down judgment in *Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers* [2023] UKSC 47 [AB/2]. Although explicitly focussed on Traveller injunctions, the Supreme Court confirmed at [167] that:

> "…there is no immovable obstacle in the way of granting injunctions against newcomer Travellers, on an essentially without notice basis, regardless of whether in form interim or final, either in terms of jurisdiction or principle…"

16. And made plain that such injunctions should only be granted (in brief summary) where:

    a. There is an evidenced compelling need to protect civil rights;

    b. There is procedural protection for the rights of affected newcomers and "[t]his will need to include an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application and any order made to the attention of all those likely to be affected by it…; and the most generous provision for liberty (ie permission) to apply to have the injunction

varied or set aside, and on terms that the grant of the injunction in the meantime does not foreclose any objection of law, practice, justice or convenience which the newcomer so applying might wish to raise"

c. Applicants have a "most stringent form of disclosure duty";

d. The injunctions must be constrained territorially and temporally so that "they neither outflank not outlast the compelling circumstances relied upon"; and

e. On the facts, granting the injunction is "just and convenient".

17. The Bennathan, CoA and Cotter Judgments confirm that the relevant legal test for the grant of an injunction on the basis of a real and imminent risk of unlawful activity have been met. It is submitted that the question for the Court at this Review Hearing is the same as that before Cotter J: whether there is a continuing threat which justifies the continuation of the Cotter Injunction and whether it should be maintained, varied or discharged.

18. NHL's submission is that the Cotter Injunction and Judgment anticipated the Supreme Court's judgment in *Wolverhampton* on which basis NHL submits that evidence shows that the Cotter Injunction should be maintained, subject to some amendments.

Evidence of Continued Threat

19. As Mr Martell explains at [SM/36] onwards, it is not the case that direct action protest <u>on roads</u> has ceased. In fact, the level of disruption and range of disruption caused by such protesters has escalated and increased [see in particular [SM/42] in relation to roads]. Ms Billing confirms that this threat has continued past the date of Martell 2 at [PB/18], and recent, specific mention has been made of glueing to roads.

20. NHL's submission is that there has been no real change to JSO's activities involving blocking roads both in London and elsewhere since the summary by Cavanagh J in *TfL v Lee* [2023] EWHC 402 (KB) at [12]-[13] which was relied upon by Cotter J in the Cotter Judgment at [66] – [67]. As Cavanagh J put it in *TFL v Lee* at [22] [AB/146]:

> "It is true that the protests are less frequent than before the end of October 2022, but there has been no change to JSO's position that it will continue its protests indefinitely, and there have been a substantial number of protests on the roads

in London since that time, including one in February 2023. The reduction in protest may be the result of a tactical decision, or it may be a result of the Winter weather, or it may be the result in part of some reduction in appetite because of the earlier injunctive relief, or a combination of all of these things, but in any event the evidence that protests will take place unless restrained by injunctive relief is as strong now as it was before Freedman J. The mere fact that some people have chosen to act in breach of the injunctions is not, of course, a reason for declining to grant a continuation (*South Buckingham DC v Porter* [2003] 2 AC 558; [2003] UKHL 26 at paragraph 32)."

21. The injunctions granted so far, and the pursuit of committal applications against contemnors, have been effective in deterring direct action protest on the SRN. However, the evidence is that direct action protest groups such as JSO remain motivated, are continuing to recruit new members and this includes members who are willing to be arrested in pursuance of their goals [SM/33 - 35]. The SRN continues to be a prime risk location for direct action protest activities and the evidence that protests will take place on the SRN unless restrained by injunctive relief is as strong now as it was before Bennathan J.

22. The importance of the SRN and the gravity of the potential harm and some of the anticipated consequences of unlawful protest activity are addressed at [SM/52 - 54]. Of particular concern are the recent threats by JSO to spend this summer focussing on airports – which are serviced by the SRN [SM/47].

23. Three more points are telling in respect of further extending the Cotter Injunction:

    a. No evidence or pleadings against variation have been received in respect of this Review Hearing. As the CoA Judgment discusses at paragraphs 40 – 41, a lack of engagement or opposition to the revised Draft Order sought [HB/181] is indicative of the absence of any arguable defence, and it is submitted that the same applies in respect of a review of a final injunction;

    b. NHL has sought the injunctions in furtherance of its statutory duties to assert and protect the rights of the general public to use the highways under the Highways Act 1980. The Court of Appeal itself noted at paragraph 23 of the CoA Judgment:

> "It is worth noting at this point that, under regulation 15 of The Motorways Traffic (England and Wales) Regulations 1982, pedestrians are not allowed on a motorway save in cases of accident or emergency (which these protests did not constitute) so that the defendants had no right to be on the M25 or other motorways and a lawful excuse defence would not have been available. Although we drew the attention of Ms Stacey KC to that provision, it was not relied upon by NHL either before the judge or before this Court."

It is submitted in that regard that in considering the balance of any rights a person may assert in respect of protesting on the SRN, there is a statutory bar, as well as strong authority in respect of the right to protest not being a right to protest in any location (*DPP v Cuciurean* at [45 – 46] [AB/227 - 228]). The recitals to the revised Draft Order sought to make plain that the Claimant does not intend to prohibit lawful protest – although NHL accepts that it is difficult to envisage any disruptive direct action protest on the SRN which would be lawful.

c. The Cotter Injunction has been kept under review by NHL, and it continues to discharge its duties under the terms of the Cotter Injunction and the relevant case authorities. Discharge of this duty is clear from the applications NHL now makes to remove all Named Defendants.

24. The analysis in the Cotter Judgment focussed on the position of Named Defendants (see [108] – [119]) and only briefly addressed D1, persons unknown at [120] – [122]. Cotter J accepted the evidence of threat from the history of the proceedings and recent statements from protest groups was sufficient to evidence a real and imminent risk of serious harm. Cotter J held at [121] that:

> "[direct action protestors] have not gone away"; rather they are as committed to their cause as ever. The success of the order in halting protests on the strategic road network underlines the importance of continuing the protection whilst the likelihood of protest action remains and does not mean that the underlying threat were no restraint to be in place has diminished".

25. NHL's respectful submission is that the evidence of Mr Martell and Ms Billing shows that the position has not changed over the course of the last year.

NHL's APPLICATIONS

26. NHL seeks a continuation of the Cotter Injunction in materially identical terms, subject to two proposed variations, and reapplications for alternative service and third party disclosure orders.

Schedule of Defendants

27. NHL seeks to amend the Schedule of Defendants to remove all Named Defendants remaining on the Cotter Injunction. The reason is that none of those Named Defendants has carried out protest activity on the SRN since November 2022. For that reason, NHL does not consider that it would be justified to keep them as Named Defendants both in terms of the principle and also as remaining as Named Defendants would potentially expose them to the costs of this Review Hearing.

Alternative Service

28. The procedural position is that in order to dispense with personal service under CPR 6.27 and to make an order for service by alternative method, the Court requires "a good reason" (CPR 6.15(1)). The Cotter Injunction contains provisions for alternative service as the Court was persuaded that there were such good reasons. NHL seeks to maintain those alternative service provisions in respect of all Defendants on the same basis as nothing has changed in the intervening period – see Cotter Judgment at [126] – [139].

29. NHL submits that the alternative service provisions for D1 are now well established and have been effective, notwithstanding the high bar to their grant. There is now even wider constructive knowledge of the Cotter Injunction amongst individual protestors and the protest groups to which they are affiliated. There is no reason to seek to vary the previous alternative service provisions, on which basis the Court is respectfully asked to make the alternative service order in respect of D1.

30. Although NHL seeks an alternative service order in respect of Named Defendants, the Court will note that that is only as regards notifying them of their removal from the Cotter Injunction, if the Court grants the application to amend the Schedule of Defendants. It is

submitted that there remain good reasons to dispense with personal service (see Cotter Judgment [138] – [139]), particularly in circumstances where the person is to be informed that they are no longer a defendant.

Period of Injunctive Relief

31. If the Court is minded to extend the Cotter Injunction, NHL seeks to extend the period of injunctive relief to two years instead of a single year.

32. In Wolverhampton, as regards Travellers, the Supreme Court held at [225] that:

> "We have considerable doubt as to whether it could ever be justifiable to grant a Gypsy or Traveller injunction which is directed to persons unknown, including newcomers, and extends over the whole of a borough or for significantly more than a year. It is to be remembered that this is an exceptional remedy, and it must be a proportionate response to the unlawful activity to which it is directed. Further, we consider that an injunction which extends borough-wide is likely to leave the Gypsy and Traveller communities with little or no room for manoeuvre, just as Coulson LJ warned might well be the case (see generally, *Bromley*, paras 99-109. Similarly, injunctions of this kind must be reviewed periodically (as Sir Geoffrey Vos MR explained in these appeals at paras 89 and 108) and in our view ought to come to an end (subject to any order of the judge), by effluxion of time in all cases after no more than a year unless an application is made for their renewal. This will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made."

33. Although that passage appears to tell against a two year injunction, the Supreme Court was considering the position where a new injunction had been granted against Travellers. The distinguishing points here are:

    a. The form of injunction has been granted by no less than 6 High Court Judges and reviewed by the CoA (who made minor amendments).

b. The Courts have found that the injunctive relief granted to NHL has been justified over a period of almost a total of three years. As has been submitted, the threat has not changed.

c. Each of the injunction orders since 2021 has had liberty to apply provisions which have never been engaged by a person affected by the injunctions.

d. Unlike Traveller injunctions, where the unlawfulness of the occupation arises following enforcement by a local authority and Travellers may have rights to occupation and/or the local authority may have failed to discharge its duties in respect of housing Travellers, direct action protest on the SRN is *prima facie* unlawful and NHL has no duties as to direct action protestors.

e. *Per* the last sentence of Wolverhampton [225] the evidence before the Court is that the injunctions have been effective, no grounds for discharge of the Cotter Injunction have emerged in almost three years, and there remains proper justification for its continuance.

34. Indeed, at [235]-[236], the Supreme Court itself distinguished protest cases as follows:

> "The emphasis in this discussion has been on newcomer injunctions in Gypsy and Traveller cases and nothing we have said should be taken as prescriptive in relation to newcomer injunctions in other cases, such as those directed at protesters who engage in direct action by, for example, blocking motorways, occupying motorway gantries or occupying HS2's land with the intention of disrupting construction. Each of these activities may, depending on all the circumstances, justify the grant of an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers. Any of these persons who have notice of the order will be bound by it, just as effectively as the injunction in the proceedings the subject of this appeal has bound newcomer Gypsies and Travellers.
>
> Counsel for the Secretary of State for Transport has submitted, and we accept that each of these cases has called for a full and careful assessment of the justification for the order sought, the rights which are or may be interfered with by the grant of the order, and the proportionality of that interference. Again, in so far as the applicant seeks an injunction against newcomers, the judge must be satisfied there is a compelling need for the order. Often the circumstances of these cases vary significantly one from another

in terms of the range and number of people who may be affected by the making or refusal of the injunction sought; the legal right to be protected; the illegality to be prevented; and the rights of the respondents to the application. The duration and geographical scope of the injunction necessary to protect the applicant's rights in any particular case are ultimately matters for the judge having regard to the general principles we have explained."

35. NHL only seeks to continue injunctive relief against persons unknown, and there is a considerable cost to the public purse in a yearly review both in terms of time spent by NHL's staff, the use of Court resources, and the cost of preparing for each review which falls on the public purse [SM/55]. Finally, NHL remains under a duty to discharge the Cotter Injunction if it becomes unnecessary.

36. For these reasons, it is submitted that it would be appropriate and proportionate to extend the Cotter Injunction for two years.

Third Party Disclosure

37. With the consent of the Police [PB/14 – 17], NHL seeks to replicate the third party disclosure order under CPR 31.7 in the Original Cotter Order. The Court will have noted the concern expressed in the Cotter Judgment, but Cotter J was persuaded on the facts to grant third party disclosure in the form set out in the Cotter Injunction.

38. Similar orders have been granted in numerous recent cases involving protest injunctions.[1] As stated in *Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2022] EWHC 1477 at [32],

"…the disclosure sought is the most sensible and efficient way to identify any breaches of the injunction".

"…any evidence that could be used by the claimants to pursue breaches [should be] gathered by the legally regulated and democratically accountable police forces of the United Kingdom".

[1] See also e.g. *Transport for London v Alyson Lee & Ors* [2022] EWHC 3102 at [94]-[97]; *Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2022] EWHC 911 (KB) at [44]; *National Highways Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2022] EWHC 1105 (KB) at [53]) and *Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Persons Unknown* [2022] EWHC 1477 at [32]

39. The application of CPR 31.17 in protest injunction cases has been considered in detail most recently in *Transport for London v Lee* [2022] EWHC 3102 (KB), Freedman J held (emphasis added):

> "94. Finally, there is the question of third party disclosure and a disclosure order under CPR 31.17 in respect of information held by the Metropolitan Police. The claimant seeks continuation of the provisions for third party disclosure of information from the Metropolitan Police. The Metropolitan Police will not provide such information voluntarily but does not oppose the making of such an order in this claim. CPR 31.17 provides a general power for the court to order a non-party to disclose information into the proceedings. Although it is established that such orders are the exception and not the rule (see *Frankson & Ors v SSHD* [2003] EWCA Civ 655 at 25), the court retains a wide discretion to make such an order in appropriate cases.
>
> 95. The essence of the test that disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim, or to save costs, is capable of being fulfilled in many different circumstances. The court can approach the issue effectively with a view to ensuring that litigation is not hampered by a lack of disclosure. Such disclosure may engage the Article 8 rights of individuals. However, any interference with that right can be justified for the protection of rights and freedoms of others. Although there are occasions where the court should consider inviting submissions on behalf of interested third parties, this is much more likely where an order is being sought for the provision of detailed documents or records, as opposed to, for instance, simply asking for disclosure of a name and address.
>
> 96. This is an order that has been made throughout the history of these demonstrations and, in my judgment, the pre-conditions for an order under CPR 31.17(3) exist in this case. They include the following:
>
> > (1) The name and address of the people concerned are likely to support the case of the claimant or adversely affect the case of one of the other parties to the proceedings. Being able to identify who the people are who have been acting in the way complained of is a central facet of the interim relief that the court has already granted. Evidence of breach will go to upholding the Just Stop Oil injunction.

(2) Disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs, because (a) without the names and addresses the claimant cannot enforce the Just Stop Oil injunction without significant impediments; and (b) the claimant needs the names and addresses in order to make good an undertaking it has given to the court to add defendants as named defendants wherever possible.

(3) Identifying the protesters will allow them to defend their position in the proceedings and it increases the fairness of the proceedings to have named defendants as far as possible.

(4) The Metropolitan Police have stated to the claimant that it will only disclose the requested information pursuant to a court order and they do not oppose the grant of the making of that order.

(5) The disruption to the public and the risks involved mean that it is proportionate to order third party disclosure.

(6) It is much more desirable for the evidence gathering to be undertaken by the police, rather than for third parties such as inquiry agents to interfere during the demonstrations in order to obtain such evidence.

97. For all these reasons, and subject to the undertakings and the other matters to which I have referred in this judgment, the injunctions sought are granted. A question arises that I will hear counsel about, about the duration of the injunctions and about how the actions will be progressed."

40. If the Court is content to grant an extension of injunctive relief, it is submitted that the third party disclosure order is a necessary component for the reasons given by Freedman J, particularly so if the Court grants the application to remove all Named Defendants. In the event of a person unknowingly breaching the Cotter Injunction, the only way NHL will be able to get details of that contemnor will be through disclosure by the Police: the third part disclosure order consented to by the Police is therefore necessary to ensure that the Cotter Injunction is effective and enforceable. There is no in principle reason not to grant the third party disclosure order, on which basis the Court is respectfully asked to continue it in the same terms as the Cotter Injunction.

Section 12 Human Rights Act 1998

41. Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 ("HRA 1998") is addressed as follows:

    a. In relation to those Defendants who do not appear and/or are not represented at this review hearing, no issue arises as to s.12(2) because NHL has taken all practicable steps to notify those Defendants, and, as has been explained, NHL's contention is that this is a review hearing of a final order for which (a) there has been service on the Defendants, (b) the Injunction Order makes specific reference to the review hearing and (c) there is in any event significant constructive knowledge of this review hearing.
    b. Similarly, in respect of s.12(3), this is a review of a final order, so, to the extent that direct action protest could amount to publication, the Court has already found that such publication should not be allowed.

CONCLUSION

42. For these reasons, the Court is respectfully invited to grant the revised Draft Order in the terms sought [HB/181], namely by:

    a. extending the Cotter Injunction

    b. permitting amendments to the Schedule of Defendants

    c. permitting alternative service

    d. granting an order for third party disclosure.

22 April 2024

MICHAEL FRY

MICHAEL FEENEY

Francis Taylor Building